This paper develops a broad theme about policy choice under ambiguity through study of a particular decision criterion. The broad theme is that, where feasible, choice between a status quo policy and an innovation is better framed as selection of a treatment allocation than as a binary decision. Study of the static minimax-regret criterion and its adaptive extension substantiate the theme. When the optimal policy is ambiguous, the static minimax-regret allocation always is fractional absent large fixed costs or deontological considerations. In dynamic choice problems, the adaptive minimax-regret criterion treats each cohort as well as possible, given the knowledge available at the time, and maximizes intertemporal learning about treatment response.
Introduction
Problems of choice between a status quo policy and an innovation occur often. In medicine, the status quo may be the prevalent treatment for a disease and the innovation a new treatment proposed by researchers. In criminal justice, the status quo may be existing guidelines for sentencing convicted offenders and the innovation a new sentencing proposal. In education, the status quo may be the present system for evaluating teachers and the innovation an alternative. In tax policy, the status quo may be the present personal income tax schedule and the innovation a different schedule.
In these and many other settings, it is common to have only partial knowledge of policy impacts, particularly concerning the innovation. The better policy choice may then be ambiguous. Formally, ambiguity occurs when there are multiple feasible states of nature and both treatments are undominated.
That is, one policy is superior in some states of nature and the other is superior in other states.
There are myriad sources of ambiguity, many deriving from identification problems that are prevalent in empirical research; see Manski (2007) for exposition. Perhaps the most fundamental identification problem arises from the unobervability of counterfactual policy outcomes. At most one can observe the outcomes that occur under realized policies. The outcomes of unrealized policies are logically unobservable.
Yet determination of an optimal policy requires comparison of all feasible policies.
Suppose that a planner must act with partial knowledge of the welfare achieved by the status quo and the innovation. How should he cope with ambiguity? The Bayesian prescription is to assert a subjective probability distribution over the feasible states of nature and choose an action that maximizes subjective expected welfare. However, a subjective probability distribution is itself a form of knowledge, and the planner may have no credible basis for asserting one. My research program on planning under ambiguity has studied problems of this type; see Manski (2005; 2006; 2007, Chapter 11) and the references contained within. In particular, I have explored application of the minimax-regret (MR) criterion to problems of treatment choice. This paper builds on my earlier work.
To begin, observe that choice between a status quo and an innovation is commonly framed as a binary decision. Either the status quo will continue in force or the innovation will replace it, becoming the new status quo. When the decision is made with partial knowledge, two types of errors may occur. A Type I error occur when an innovation that actually is worse than the status quo is judged superior with the available information. A Type II error occurs when an innovation that is actually better than the status quo is judged inferior with the available information.
This paper argues that, where feasible, choice between a status quo policy and an innovation should be framed as selection of a treatment allocation rather than as a binary decision. Selection of a treatment allocation is feasible when a planner chooses treatments for each member of a population and can treat different members differentially. In these settings, the planner need not make a singleton allocation, assigning all persons to the same treatment. He can instead choose a fractional allocation, assigning positive fractions of the population to both the status quo treatment and the innovation.
Fractional allocations cope with ambiguity through diversification. Whereas singleton allocations offer a stark choice between possible commission of a Type I or Type II error, fractional allocations make both types of errors but reduce their magnitudes. Depending on the criterion used to make decisions under ambiguity, a planner may find an interior solution preferable to a corner solution. In particular, this occurs when a planner uses the minimax-regret criterion to choose a treatment allocation. The MR criterion places equal weight on Type I and Type II errors and chooses an allocation that balances their potential welfare effects.
When considering fractional treatment allocations, it is important to distinguish differential treatment of persons who vary in observable respects from differential treatment of persons who are observationally identical. It is well known that enabling treatment choice to vary systematically with observed covariates of population members can improve utilitarian welfare if treatment response varies with these covariates; see, for example, Manski (2005, Sec. 1.2) . My concern here is with differential treatment of persons who are observationally identical. Differential treatment of this type necessarily is random, not systematic.
For example, a physician could in principle assign some observationally identical patients to the status quo treatment and others to the innovation. A judge could apply the existing sentencing guidelines to some convicted offenders and a new sentencing proposal to others. A school district could use the status quo system to evaluate some teachers and apply an alternative system to others. The federal government could apply the present personal income tax schedule to some persons and a different schedule to others.
Why might fractional treatment allocations be beneficial? I develop three reasons in Sections 2 through 4 respectively. First, fractional allocations enlarge the set of feasible policy choices by convexifying the singleton allocations. Second, such allocations are advantageous for learning because they generate randomized experiments that yield informative outcome data on both treatments. Third, fractional allocations enable better results when policy is determined by non-cooperative decision processes. I elaborate below and then call attention to a possible ethical objection to fractional allocations.
Convexifying the Set of Policy Choices
Binary choice between the status quo and the innovation is an all-or-nothing decision. Fractional allocations convexify the singleton allocations, thereby greatly enlarging the set of feasible policy choices.
The relative desirability of fractional and singleton allocations solutions depends on the criterion used for decision making under ambiguity. In previous work studying static planning problems, I have shown that the minimax-regret criterion always yields a fractional allocation when there are two undominated treatments, outcomes are bounded, and welfare increases linearly with the population mean outcome (Manski, 2007, Complement 11A) . Moreover, the MR allocation has a simple explicit form.
Section 2 reviews this finding and uses the sentencing of convicted offenders to illustrate. I then extend the analysis to a broader class of welfare functions than I have considered previously. In particular, I permit monotonic transformations of the welfare function, address planning problems with non-additive cost of treatment, and consider deontological welfare functions.
Learning Treatment Outcomes
The convexification argument for differential treatment of observationally identical persons applies equally to static and dynamic planning problems. The learning argument pertains specifically to dynamic problems. Suppose that, in each period, a planner chooses treatments for the current cohort of a population.
Then learning may be possible, with observation of treatment outcomes in earlier periods informing treatment choice in later periods. Fractional treatment allocations randomize persons into treatment and, hence, are particularly informative.
Section 3 considers dynamic planning under ambiguity from the minimax-regret perspective. I suggest use of the nicely tractable adaptive minimax-regret (AMR) criterion, which treats each cohort as well as possible in the static minimax-regret sense, using the information available at the time. The result is a fractional treatment allocation whenever the available knowledge does not suffice to determine which treatment is better. The criterion is adaptive because knowledge of treatment response accumulates over time, so successive cohorts may receive different fractional allocations. I use medical treatment to illustrate application of the AMR criterion. I explain how the AMR criterion differs from the current practice of randomized clinical trials in medicine.
Improving Non-Cooperative Decisions
Sections 2 and 3 are written from the perspective of a planner with the power to dictate policy. Section 4 considers situations in which polices are determined by non-cooperative decision processes. Just as convexification of the set of policy choices can be beneficial to a planner, it can also improve noncooperative decisions. I examine a two-agent setting where the agents may have different welfare functions and beliefs about the feasible states of nature. If both agents face ambiguity and use the AMR criterion to compare allocations, then there exist fractional allocations that both prefer to the singleton allocations. I use an educational policy choice to illustrate.
Equal Treatment of Equals
A possible ethical objection to fractional treatment allocations is that they violate one interpretation of the normative principle calling for "equal treatment of equals." Fractional allocations are consistent with this principle in the ex ante sense that all observationally identical people have the same probability of receiving a particular treatment. They violate the principle in the ex post sense that observationally identical persons ultimately receive different treatments.
The ex post sense of equal treatment expresses a deontological consideration that is absent from the consequentialist welfare functions usually asssumed in economic analysis of planning. I formalize this consideration in Section 2.4 and show how it affects the treatment allocation of a planner who uses the minimax-regret criterion.
Static Planning Problems
Section 2.1 reviews relevant elements of my previous analysis of planning under ambiguity. Sections 2.2 through 2.4 extend the analysis in several new directions.
Treatment Allocation with Linear Welfare

Basic Concepts and Notation
There are two treatments, labeled a and b; the set of feasible treatments is T / {a, b}. Treatment a is the status quo and b is the innovation. The semantic distinction between the status quo and the innovation plays no role in the general analysis described here, which broadly concerns choice between two treatments.
The distinction becomes meaningful when the analysis is applied. In particular, more may be known about the status quo treatment than about the innovation. treatment t and realizes outcome y (t). For example, u (t) may have the "benefit-cost" form u (t) = y (t) ! y (t), where y (t) is the benefit of treatment t and y (t) is its cost.
I assume for simplicity that all members of the population are observationally identical. In practice, persons may have observable covariates, and a planner may be able to differentially treat persons with different covariates. In such cases, the present analysis can be applied separately to each sub-population of persons who share the same covariates. There is no optimal treatment allocation under ambiguity. Yet the planner must somehow choose an allocation. To accomplish this, decision theorists have proposed various ways of transforming the original optimization problem, which cannot be solved, into another one that can be solved.
Bayesians recommend that the planner assert a subjective distribution on the states of nature and choose an allocation that maximize subjective mean welfare with respect to this distribution. The maximin and the minimax-regret criteria do not use a subjective distribution. Instead they choose allocations that, in different senses, perform uniformly well over all states of nature.
I briefly discuss the Bayes and maximin criteria and then consider the minimax-regret criterion more fully. It turns out that the minimax-regret criteria yields a qualitatively different allocation than do the Bayes and maximin criteria. Bayesian and maximin treatment allocations are generally singleton, assigning all persons to the same treatment. In contrast, the minimax-regret allocation under ambiguity is always fractional, assigning positive fractions of the population to both treatments.
Bayes Rules
A Bayesian planner places a subjective probability distribution ð on the states of nature, computes the subjective mean value of social welfare under each treatment allocation, and chooses an allocation that maximizes this subjective mean. Thus, the planner solves the optimization problem Although Bayesian planning is conceptually straightforward, it may not be straightforward to form a credible subjective distribution on the states of nature. The allocation chosen by a Bayesian planner depends on the subjective distribution used. Here, as always, the Bayesian paradigm is appealing only when a decision maker is able to form a subjective distribution that really expresses his beliefs.
The Maximin Criterion
To determine the maximin allocation, one first computes the minimum welfare attained by each allocation across all states of nature. One then chooses an allocation that maximizes this minimum welfare.
Thus, the criterion is
The solution has a simple form if (á , â ) is a feasible value of (á, â). Then the maximin allocation is ä =
The Minimax-Regret Criterion
By definition, the regret of treatment allocation ä in state of nature s is the difference between the maximum achievable welfare and the welfare achieved with this allocation. The maximum welfare ss ss s s s achievable in state of nature s is max (á , â ). Hence, allocation ä has regret max (á ,
The minimax-regret rule computes the maximum regret of each allocation over all states of nature and chooses an allocation to minimize maximum regret. Thus, the criterion is
Let S(a) and S(b) be the subsets of S on which treatments a and b are superior. That is, let S(a) /
Define M(a) = 0 if S(a) is empty and M(b) = 0 if S(b) is empty. Manski (2007, Complement 11A) proves that the MR criterion always makes a fractional treatment allocation when both treatments are undominated.
The result is
The proof is short and straightforward, so I reproduce it here.
Proof:
The maximum regret of rule ä on all of S is max [R(ä, a), R(ä, b)], where
are maximum 
Result (7) simplifies further if á or â is fully known. Full knowledge for the innovation is rarely realistic, but one may have full knowledge for the status quo from observation of past experience. Thus, suppose that
Choosing Sentences for Convicted Juvenile Offenders
To illustrate, consider the problem of choosing sentences for a population of convicted offenders.
I apply findings reported in Manski and Nagin (1998) , who studied the sentencing and recidivism of male youth in the state of Utah who were convicted of offenses before they reached age 16.
In this illustration, the planner is the state of Utah and the population are males under age 16 who are convicted of an offence. The status quo policy is a decentralized system where judges have discretion to choose between residential confinement and a sentence that does not involve confinement. I take the innovation to be a policy of mandatory confinement for all convicted offenders. I take the outcome of interest to be a binary measure of recidivism. Specifically, y(t) = 1 if an offender who receives treatment t is not convicted of a subsequent crime in the two-year period following sentencing, and y(t) = 0 if the offender is convicted of a subsequent crime. Let u(t) = y(t). Then á = P[y(a) = 1] and â = P[y(b) = 1].
Analyzing data on outcomes under the status quo policy, Manski and Nagin (1998) find that á = 0.61.
The data do not fully identify â. In the absence of knowledge of how judges choose sentences or how juveniles respond to their sentences, the data reveal only that â 0 [0.03, 0.92]. Thus, the innovation may be much better or worse than the status quo. Manski and Nagin (1998) argue that this "worst-case" bound on â is germane to policy making because criminologists have found it difficult to learn how sentencing affects recidivism. Researchers have long debated the counterfactual outcomes that offenders would experience if they were to receive other sentences. 
Monotone Transformations of the Welfare Function
The planning problem described in Section 2.1 has many extensions that warrant analysis. Section 3 will study its extension from static to dynamic settings. Before that, Sections 2.2 through 2.4 perform three extensions within the static context.
A monotone generalization of welfare function (1) is
where f(@) is strictly increasing in its argument. The specific shape of f(@) is immaterial to treatment choice when one treatment is superior in all states of nature. Whatever monotone function f(@) may be, ä = 0 is ss ss optimal if (á $ â , s 0 S) and ä = 1 if (á # â , s 0 S). However, shape matters when a planner faces ambiguity.
It is tempting to say that the shape of f(@) expresses social risk preferences, with linear f(@) conveying risk neutrality and concave f(@) implying risk aversion. This language has a clear interpretation in Bayesian planning, where linear f(@) implies indifference between mean-preserving spreads of a gamble and concave f(@) implies a preference for gambles with smaller spreads. However, the Bayesian definition of risk preferences does not carry over to maximin and minimax-regret planning, which do not use a subjective probability distribution. Hence, I do not associate the shape of f(@) with risk preferences here.
Bayes Rules
A Bayesian planner with welfare function (9) solves the optimization problem ss s
The solution is generically singleton if f(@) is convex, but it may be fractional if f(@) has concave segments. Manski and Tetenov (2007, Proposition 5) consider the special case where the planner knows á and is ð uncertain only about â. They show that the Bayes allocation is ä = 0 if f(@) is concave and E (â) < á.
ð However, it is fractional if f(@) is continuously differentiable, E (â) > á, and If(â)dð < f(á).
The Maximin Criterion
The maximin problem
has the same solution for all strictly increasing f(@). Thus, the shape of f(@) does not affect the maximin allocation.
The Minimax-Regret Criterion
The shape of f(@) does affect the solution to the minimax-regret problem ss ss
Nevertheless, the central qualitative finding of Section 2.2 continues to hold with almost complete generality.
I show here that the MR allocation is fractional whenever f(@) is continuous. 
Hence, the MR allocation solves the equation
The solution is
Comparison of (7) and (16) shows that the MR allocations under linear and logarithmic welfare UU coincide when â = á , but they otherwise generally differ from one another. In particular, the two allocations differ when the planner knows á and has partial knowledge of â. Then (16) reduces to
Hence, the fraction of the population allocated to the innovation when welfare is logarithmic is smaller than when welfare is linear. For example, in the sentencing illustration of Section 2.1, the MR allocation with logarithmic welfare is 0.26 rather than the 0.35 found with linear welfare.
Non-Additive Cost of Treatment
Treatment may be costly. The foregoing analysis covers settings where the aggregate cost of a treatment allocation is the sum of individual treatment costs. This was alluded to in Section 2.1, where I j j j1 j2 j1
observed that u (t) may have the benefit-cost form u (t) = y (t) ! y (t), where y (t) is the benefit when person j2 j receives treatment t and y (t) is the cost. There are many ways in which cost might be non-additive. This section considers the polar cases of capacity constraints and fixed costs. 
Capacity Constraints
ä = 1 ! ç(a) if ä < 1 ! ç(a), MR MR ä if ä 0 [1 ! ç(a), ç(b)], MR ç(b) if ä > ç(b).
Fixed Costs
A fixed cost is a cost component that equals zero when no one receives a treatment and takes a constant positive value when any positive fraction of the population receives the treatment. For simplicity, I suppose that the welfare function is linear and that the fixed costs have known values that do not vary with the state of nature. Thus, the welfare function is
The problem of interest is treatment choice under ambiguity. Let S(a) and S(b) be the subsets of S 
Proof: For any ä 0 [0, 1], the maximum regret of ä on all of S is max [R(ä, a), R(ä, b)], where
are maximum regret on S(a) and S(b).
Application of (21) Application of (21) at ä 0 (0, 1) gives
The minimum of maximum regret over ä 0 (0, 1) solves the equation
Hence, the minimax regret allocation on ä 0 (0, 1) is 
Thus, a common fixed cost smaller than min {M(a), M(b)} ! ä M(a) has no effect on the minimax-regret allocation. However, a larger fixed cost makes the allocation singleton.
Deontological Welfare Functions
Sections 2.1 through 2.3 maintained the traditional consequentialist assumption that policy choices matter only for the outcomes they yield. Deontological ethics supposes that choices may have intrinsic value, apart from their consequences.
In Section 2.3, the fixed costs C(a) and C(b) made the treatment allocation affect welfare directly, regardless of the resulting outcomes. Although I then described C(a) and C(b) in ordinary economic language as fixed costs, welfare function (19) can be interpreted as expressing the deontological idea that any use of treatment a or b is normatively bad per se, with C(a) and C(b) expressing the respective welfare losses. A more general class of deontological welfare functions is
where g(@) is a specified function of ä.
Equal Treatment of Equals
When considering fractional treatment allocations, a particularly salient deontological idea is the The equal fixed-cost case considered at the end of Section 2.3 has the form g(0) = g(1) = !C and g(ä)
= !2C for ä 0 (0, 1). Thus, placing value C on the deontological consideration of equal ex post treatment MR does not affect the minimax-regret allocation if C < min {M(a), M(b)} ! ä M(a). However, it makes the minimax-regret allocation singleton if C is larger.
3.Dynamic Planning Problems
This section considers dynamic problems. I suppose that, in each period, a planner must choose treatments for the current cohort of a population. The planner wants to maximize the welfare of each cohort.
The essential new feature of dynamic problems is that learning is possible, with observation of the outcomes experienced by earlier cohorts informing treatment choice for later cohorts. Fractional treatment allocations are advantageous for learning because they generate randomized experiments yielding outcome data on both treatments. Sampling variation is not an issue when cohorts are large, so all fractional allocations yield the same information. Hence, the choice among fractional allocations may be based on other grounds.
I suggest use of the adaptive minimax-regret (AMR) criterion. In each period, the AMR criterion applies the static minimax-regret criterion of Section 2, using the information available at the time. In the absence of large fixed costs or deontological considerations, the result is a fractional allocation whenever both treatments are undominated. The AMR criterion is adaptive because successive cohorts may receive different allocations as knowledge of treatment response accumulates over time.
Section 3.1 formalizes the AMR criterion. Section 3.2 illustrates its application to a hypothetical problem of medical treatment. Section 3.3 discusses how the AMR criterion differs from the current medical practice of randomized clinical trials.
The Adaptive Minimax-Regret Criterion
To frame the dynamic planning problem we need to extend the concepts and notation used earlier.
Let n = 0, 1, . . . . , N denote the periods in which treatment allocations must be chosen. In each period, the set of feasible treatments is T = {a, b}. The planner's problem is to allocate each cohort between the two nn treatments. A treatment allocation is a vector ä / (ä , n = 0, . . . , N) that randomly assigns a fraction ä of n cohort n to treatment b and the remaining 1 ! ä to treatment a. The AMR criterion provides an appealing myopic decision rule. The criterion in period n is ss n s n s 
All of the other findings in Section 2 extend in the same way.
The AMR criterion has practical and normative appeal. The practical appeal is its simplicity. The static minimax-regret allocation has a particularly transparent form when welfare is linear. The AMR allocation (25) inherits this transparency.
The normative appeal is that the AMR criterion treats each cohort as well as possible, in the minimax-regret sense, given the available knowledge. It does not ask the members of one cohort to sacrifice its own welfare for the benefit of future cohorts. Nevertheless, the AMR criterion is informationally beneficial to future cohorts in the broad class of settings where it yields a fractional treatment allocation under ambiguity. Unless large fixed costs or deontological considerations make the AMR allocation singleton, application of the criterion maximizes cross-cohort learning about treatment response.
Treating a Life-Threatening Disease
This section illustrates application of the AMR criterion. I present a hypothetical treatment-choice problem in which the outcome of interest unfolds over multiple periods. As empirical evidence accumulates, the AMR treatment allocation changes accordingly.
Consider treatment of a life-threatening disease. The planner may be an independent physician, a . A year later, one can observe whether patient j is still alive and hence can jj determine whether y (t) = 0 or y (t) $ 1. And so on until year five, when the outcome is fully observable. Table 1 presents hypothetical data on annual death rates following treatment by the status quo and the innovation. The entries show that 20 (10) percent of the patients who receive the status quo (innovation) die within the first year after treatment. In each of the later years, the death rates are 5 and 2 percent respectively. Overall, the mean numbers of years lived after treatment are á = 3.5 and â = 4.3. The former value is known at the outset from historical experience. The latter gradually becomes observable. Assume that the planner measures welfare by a patient's length of life; thus, u(t) = y(t). Also assume that the planner has no initial knowledge of â. That is, he does not know whether the innovation will be disastrous, with all patients dying in the first year following treatment, or entirely successful, with all patients 5 he knows that the innovation is better than the status quo, and so sets ä = 1. The final two columns of Table 1 give the maximum regret and mean life span of each cohort, both computed using the AMR treatment allocation.
The AMR Criterion and the Current Practice of Randomized Clinical Trials
The illustration of Section 3.2 exemplifies a host of settings in which a medical planner must choose between a well-understood status quo treatment and an innovation whose properties are only partially known.
When facing situations of this kind, it has been common to commission randomized clinical trials (RCTs) to learn about the innovation. The fractional allocations produced by the AMR criterion are randomized experiments, so it is natural to ask how application of the AMR criterion differs from the current practice of RCTs. There are many major differences, described below. 
Measurement of Outcomes:
Under the AMR criterion, one observes the health outcomes of real interest as they unfold over time and one uses these data to inform subsequent treatment decisions. In contrast, current
RCTs typically have short durations of two to three years at most. For example, a three-year trial on the disease described in Table 1would only reveal that â 0 [2. 64, 4.36] . Attempting to learn from trials of short duration, researchers often measure surrogate outcomes rather than health outcomes of real interest. For example, treatments for heart disease may be evaluated using data on patient cholesterol levels and blood pressure rather than heart attacks and life span. Extrapolation from surrogate outcomes to outcomes of interest can be difficult; see Fleming and Demets (1996) . 
Blinding of Treatment
Use of Empirical Evidence in Decision Making:
Choosing a treatment allocation to minimize maximum regret is remote from the way that the findings of RCTs are now used in decision making. The conventional approach is to perform a statistical hypothesis test, the null hypothesis being that the innovation is no better than the status quo treatment and the alternative being that it is better. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the status quo treatment continues in force and no one subsequently receives the innovation. If the null is rejected, the innovation replaces the status quo as the treatment of choice. A decision mechanism of this type is institutionalized in the drug approval process of the U. S. Food and Drug Administration; see Fisher and Moyé (1999) .
Adaptive Clinical Trials
The AMR criterion shares a broad familial relationship with the idea of adaptive clinical trials, but differs in important respects. Adaptive trials sequentially draw subjects into traditional clinical trials and use a frequentist or Bayesian statistical criterion to make the allocation of new subjects across treatments a function of the outcomes observed to date for subjects drawn earlier. The objective, as stated in Tamura et al. (1994, p. 768) , is to "use the observed response data to adapt the allocation probabilities, so that more patients will hopefully receive the better treatment."
The AMR criterion shares with adaptive trials the broad objective of using observed treatment responses to inform subsequent treatment choices. However, these ideas differ in two ways. First, the AMR criterion proposes fractional allocation of the entire patient population, not a sample of volunteers. Second, the AMR criterion is intended to cope with ambiguity rather than the statistical imprecision that motivates adaptive trials. Indeed, the large-population assumption maintained in this paper render statistical imprecision a negligible concern.
The idealization of a large population approximates well the actual environment for treatment of widespread conditions such as diabetes, heart disease, and various cancers. However, statistical imprecision in empirical findings on treatment response may be a serious cause of errors when the patient population is small. Prescription of how a planner might reasonably behave in a dynamic choice setting when facing both ambiguity and statistical imprecision is an open and difficult question.
Non-Cooperative Decision Processes
Sections 2 and 3 studied decision making by a planner who can dictate the treatment allocation.
Planners possessing close to unilateral decision power exist in some important settings. Consider, for example, centralized health care systems where governmental agencies or private HMOs choose medical treatments for their patents. These planners can more or less unilaterally implement the AMR criterion.
Treatment allocations often result from non-cooperative decision processes. Manski (2008) prefer ä to all ä < ä , both prefer ä to all ä > ä , and preferences differ for ä 0 [ä ,
Consider a decision process that calls on each agent to announce his preferred allocation and then, giving deference to the status quo, selects the smaller of the two reported values. This process makes it optimal for each agent to reveal his preferred allocation truthfully, regardless of what the other agent 1nAMR announces. Thus, ä is the chosen allocation. This result is pareto efficient. Alternatively, one could give deference to the innovation and select the larger of the two reported values. This decision rule also 2nAMR makes truthtelling optimal and yields the pareto efficient allocation ä .
When there is conflict between the preferences of two agents, society usually defers to the status quo rather than to the innovation. This is especially evident in the American legal system. A longstanding tenet of the legal system is that the plaintiff in a civil proceeding bears the burden of proof to show that an action by the defendant (the status quo) is improper. This tenet was recently applied by the U.S. Supreme Court to choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation. To illustrate the non-cooperative decision problem, consider an educational setting where the problem is to choose between a status quo policy for teacher evaluation and an innovation. The two agents are a school district and a teacher's union. The status quo is the traditional system basing evaluation on scrutiny of teacher preparation and observation of classroom lesson delivery. The innovation bases teacher evaluation on student performance in standardized tests. The contract between the school district and the union requires that any departure from the status quo be approved by both agents.
A potential instance of this teacher evaluation problem is described in a recent article in the New York Times (Medina, 2008) :
"New York City has embarked on an ambitious experiment, yet to be announced, in which some 2,500 teachers are being measured on how much their students improve on annual standardized tests.
. . . . . . While officials say it is too early to determine how they will use the data, which is already being collected, they say it could eventually be used to help make decisions on teacher tenure or as a significant element in performance evaluations and bonuses. . . . . Randi Weingarten, the union president, said she had grave reservations about the project, and would fight if the city tried to use the information for tenure or formal evaluations or even publicized it. She and the city disagree over whether such moves would be allowed under the contract."
Thus, New York City is acting unilaterally to collect data that could potentially be used to evaluate teachers.
The contemplated change from the status quo differs from a fractional allocation as defined in this paper because the participating schools were not randomly drawn from the population of New York City schools.
This difference aside, the allocation that the City has in mind is fractional with ä about equal to 0.10.
New York City appears to see itself as a planner with unilateral power to implement the innovation.
However, the teacher's union asserts that any departure from the status quo policy requires their agreement.
The Times reporter writes that an attempted unilateral decision by the City "would undoubtedly open up a legal battle with the teacher's union."
Suppose that implementation of a new policy requires agreement by the City and the union. As presently framed, the decision problem is a static noncooperative choice between ä = 0 and ä = 0.10. It n would be better to frame it as a noncooperative choice of ä 0 [0, 1] in a sequence of periods n, with observed outcomes in earlier periods informing treatment choice in later ones.
The fact that the City currently contemplates a fractional allocation suggests that it views itself as facing a problem of policy choice under ambiguity. The union's perception is not yet apparent, because it
